International financial linkages, particularly through global bank flows, generate important questions about the consequences for economic and financial stability, including the ability of countries to conduct autonomous monetary policy. I address the monetary autonomy issue in the context of the international policy trilemma: Countries seek three typically desirable but jointly unattainable objectives-stable exchange rates, free international capital mobility, and monetary policy autonomy oriented toward, and effective at, achieving domestic goals. I argue that global banking entails some features that are distinct from the broad issues of capital market openness captured in existing studies. In principle, if global banks with affiliates in foreign markets can reduce frictions in international capital flows, then the macroeconomic policy trilemma could bind tighter and interest rates will exhibit more co-movement across countries. However, if the information content and stickiness of the claims and services provided are enhanced relative to a benchmark alternative, then global banks can weaken the trilemma rather than enhance it. The result is a prediction of heterogeneous effects on monetary autonomy, tied to the business models of the global banks and whether countries are investment or funding locations for those banks. Empirical tests of the trilemma support this view that global bank effects are heterogeneous and that the primary drivers of monetary autonomy are exchange rate regimes.
I. Introduction
Financial globalization is frequently criticized, with concerns voiced about consequent increases in economic volatility and disruptions to monetary policy autonomy. Questions about the structure of the system for international capital flows and funding intermediation are of first order importance, and actively debated. 2 One concern is that such globalization amplifies the vulnerability of economies to shocks, while limiting the tools that central banks and policy authorities have for addressing the shocks generated at home and abroad. In the aftermath of the Great Recession and global financial crisis, particular attention has been focused on the activities of global banks and their contribution to economic vulnerability. Do these banks play a role in stabilizing or destabilizing host markets? Do global banks make it more difficult for countries to use local interest rates to address domestic cyclical needs, thereby reducing monetary autonomy?
In this paper, I focus on the relationship between global banks, international shock transmission, and monetary policy autonomy. Throughout, I consider banks as global when they have international activity achieved at least in part through networks of physical branches and subsidiaries in foreign countries. This type of global activity has increased dramatically in recent decades, whether measured in terms of cross-border funding flows, local lending by bank branches and subsidiaries in host markets, counts of foreign banks operating in local markets, or the share of local intermediation activity accounted for by global banks. The composition of international funds provided has also changed tremendously, with more emphasis on longer-term funding, greater use of internal capital markets as compared to cross-border transactions, and more off-balance sheet activity in the form of derivatives, credit guarantees, and commitments. Additionally, global banks use offshore financial centers to a greater degree, and have become more complex organizations in terms of their structures, geographical reach, and service provision.
The consequence of openness to international capital flows for monetary policy autonomy is not a new question. This theme is directly confronted in literature on the macroeconomic policy trilemma, wherein countries seek three typically desirable but jointly unattainable objectives: stable exchange rates, free international capital mobility, and monetary policy autonomy oriented toward and effective at achieving domestic goals (for example, see Taylor (2005, 2010) ). Monetary autonomy, proxied by low interest rate co-movement, is most obtainable under flexible exchange rate regimes and some forms of capital flow restrictions (Klein and Shambaugh 2013) .
Does the presence of global banks per se require some distinct considerations relative to other forms of international capital movements? I argue that this distinction matters. In principal, if global banks enter markets by establishing affiliates, this can lead to reduced frictions in international capital flows. In turn, the macroeconomic policy trilemma could bind tighter and interest rates will exhibit more co-movement across countries. Research already shows that international capital flows through global banks adjust rapidly to shocks through cross-border and internal capital markets, so local monetary policy effects through the bank lending channel can be weakened (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012a ). However, it also could be the case that, if the global banks are engaged in local lending activity, the information content and stickiness of the claims and services provided in the host market are enhanced relative to a benchmark alternative This higher information intensity may enable more stability of flows to individual non-bank counterparties in host markets, even in the face of larger macroeconomic disturbances and diminishing financial frictions. Such an argument is consistent with the observation that the presence of global banks is tied to the reduced incidence of crises across countries. . In this case, the global banks can weaken the trilemma rather than enhance it. Overall, heterogeneity in shock transmission and autonomy effects across countries and types of counterparties should be expected, and could depend on the form of foreign bank entry, the information content of loans, and the role of affiliate markets in the overall parent organizations as funding sources or investment locations (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012c) .
I conduct empirical tests of the trilemma, closely following the analyses of Shambaugh (2005, 2010) and Klein and Shambaugh (2013) , but also adding variables that introduce the extent of global bank penetration of local economies. The share of global banks in domestic credit creation, not the relative counts of banks with operations in a country, is correlated with interest rate co-movements in countries with pegged or floating exchange rate regimes. In particular, global bank presence is associated with stronger interest rate co-movements in the pegged rate countries that have the most open capital accounts. Global bank penetration matters, while standard measures of capital account openness do not, for floating exchange rate countries, and is associated with higher interest rate co-movements. That said, exchange rate regimes matter most and are the primary reason for differences in interest rate co-movements across countries.
Does this mean that global banking does exacerbate a policy trilemma? In some cases the answer may be yes, but not conclusively so. Global banks follow customers into many markets, and should be correlated with international trade activity, which is not a separate control in the regressions.
At the same time, the transmission of shocks between economies through banks is quite heterogeneous, as are the expected effects for the macro-economy. Some host countries are investment locations for banks, where information-intensity of transactions plays a larger role, while other locations are funding locations. Indeed, recent work also suggests that the complexity of the overall global bank parent organization may influence transmission (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2013b) , alongside the health and vulnerabilities of banks (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2011) , and the structure of finance beyond these banks should matter for transmission and macroeconomic consequences. Clearly, more work is needed before a "negative" assessment of the effects of global banks on monetary policy autonomy is levied.
Finally, it is worth noting that my arguments go in a different direction from those of Rey (2013) , who considers the large gross capital flows in international banking and elsewhere as destabilizing economies and making more difficult the conduct of monetary policy. These gross flows certainly could contribute to the incidence of crises, and the severity of crises as also argued by Obstfeld (2012) .
However, net flows and the specific counterparties for these flows might matter more for the regular conduct of monetary policy. Moreover, research generally shows that the entry of global banks into economies, especially emerging market ones, has reduced crisis vulnerabilities rather than enhanced these.
Section II proceeds by presenting trends in global banking across recent decades. Section III presents key lessons from the literature that examines the roles of global banks in international shock transmission and business cycle co-movement. Section IV turns to evidence on the international macroeconomic policy trilemma, and Section V concludes with a discussion of some outstanding challenges.
II. Trends in banking globalization and international flows
To provide perspective for understanding the macroeconomic consequences of global banks, this section presents facts on the scale and composition of international banking activity. Consider first the international banking flows by approximately thirty countries that report consolidated, national data at a quarterly frequency to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). These data reflect banks' "onbalance sheet" financial claims vis-à-vis the rest of the world, aggregated across all banks within each reporting country. They cover contractual lending by the head office, its branches, and subsidiaries on a worldwide consolidated basis, i.e. net of inter-office accounts. Intermediation activity includes the extension of credit by a bank headquartered in a particular country to residents of another country, and can occur via: (i) cross-border lending; (ii) local lending by affiliates established in the foreign country, or (iii) lending booked by an affiliate established in a third country (e.g. an international financial center).
The underlying financial instruments could be loans, deposits, or securities, as well as derivatives contracts and contingent facilities. Insert Figure 3 here 3 The types of claims reported to the BIS are described as international claims and foreign claims. International claims encompass the cross-border lending and local claims extended by foreign affiliates of the parent bank that are denominated in foreign currency. Foreign claims are broader than international claims, in that they also capture local claims denominated in local currency terms. The data do not cover asset management services. Parts of section update evidence provided in BIS CGFS No. 41 (2010) on long term trends in international banking. 4 Some of these flows may respond more to stress events, leading to greater volatility in bank financing than in foreign direct investment, portfolio equity, and net international debt securities.
Insert Figure 4 here
The opportunity to shift activities from being cross-border to locally-based arose with the establishment of branches and affiliates of global banks in host markets. As carefully documented by Various studies explore the entry decisions by these banks, including Buch (2003 Buch ( , 2005 , Focarelli and Pozzolo (2006) and Lehner (2009 ). Niepmann (2013 provides a model where more efficient banks are able to absorb fixed costs of entry into foreign markets, and therefore access these markets through local affiliates instead of crossborder flows, monitoring customers and absorbing higher costs then domestic banks. Empirical evidence by Buch, Koch, and Koetter (2012) provide support for size and efficiency arguments. Cerutti, Dell'Ariccia and Peria 2007 explore the decision over form of entry through branches or subsidiaries. 6 Examples of studies providing direct evidence are Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012 a,b,c, and Duwell 2013. 7 These positions of international banks are captured by BIS banking statistics for the period since 2005 and fall under "other exposures". The derivative positions are the "net value of derivatives", including derivatives used to hedge balance sheet positions, but not derivatives used for proprietary trading.
the economic consequences of this activity are the subject of ongoing analyses (For example, Rose and Spiegel (2007) ).
Insert Figure 7 here
Insert Figure 8 here
The growth in global banking activity is accompanied by a large increase in the complexity of these organizations, as measured by the number and industrial classifications of their affiliates (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2013a) . There is a widespread perception that the size of organizations is closely mapped to the complexity of organizations. While higher value organizations do tend to have greater numbers of affiliates, especially when considering the largest of financial institutions, this tight link is absent when geographic and business line complexity are considered. Still to be determined are reasons for such complexity: whether due to a search for production efficiency, tax avoidance, information obfuscation, or other explanations. Many global bank affiliates are found within the parent organization's borders, but other affiliates are scattered worldwide). Complexity may be intertwined with the role of global banks in international shock transmission. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2013b) posit that the US branches of foreign banks may play a larger role in liquidity provision and insurance when they are part of more complex global organizations.
III. Global Banks and International Shock Transmission
Ultimately I ask the question of whether banking globalization, distinct from other forms of international financial integration, undermines the ability of countries to conduct autonomous monetary policy.
Before turning to empirical tests related to that proposition, in this section I review evidence on global banks and international shock transmission. I begin with evidence that financial integration strengthens international co-movement of business cycles and the transmission of shocks across markets, and then turn to global bank roles.
III.1 Financial Globalization and business cycle co-movements.
Alternative theoretical frameworks use two-country models to understand the role of financial globalization in the international propagation of shocks originating in one country and leading to more synchronized business cycles. Calibrated models introduce financial frictions and international business (2005)). Financial integration raises business cycle synchronization among a sample of industrialized countries, even though these countries also tend to be more specialized (Imbs 2004 ).
The financial integration that is viewed as enhancing business cycle co-movement is not purely a story about international risk sharing. Empirical evaluations of risk sharing patterns among countries exhibiting differing degrees of international financial integration finds it is at best modest, and certainly nowhere near the levels predicted by theory (Terrones et al. 2007 ). In addition, only industrial countries have attained better risk sharing outcomes during the recent period of globalization. This evidence concludes that developing countries have been partly shut out of this benefit because portfolio debt, which has dominated the external liability stocks of most emerging markets until recently, is not conducive to risk sharing.
III.2 Direct Evidence on Global banks and International Shock Transmission
What is the specific role of global banks in business cycle co-movements? The diversification benefits of risk-sharing in banking are illustrated in basic macro-banking models where integration tends 8 For example, see Devereux and Yetman (2010) , Kollman, Enders and Muller, 2011 , Dedola and Lombardo (2012 ), and Meier (2013 . 9 Adrian and Shin (2010) argue that financial intermediaries -and more generally the suppliers of credit --drive the business cycle through their role in driving the price of risk, and argue (in a one country setting) that balance sheet aggregates such as total assets and leverage are the relevant financial intermediary aggregates to consider in macroeconomic analysis. In their context, with data on the United States, the quantitative discussion considers both the banking and shadow banking system or more market-based intermediaries such as broker-dealers (and which are dependent on more volatile external finance). The institutional structure of intermediation is stressed. In principle, these arguments should extend to the international environment and the location of sensitivities to changes in risk and leverage.
to dampen the effect of bank capital shocks within borders, but amplifies the effect of bank-specific shocks across borders (Morgan, Strahan, and Rime (2004) ). In the international setting, the dampening of local shocks starts with a basic observation that the availability of loanable funds via the home deposit base contributes to the pro-cyclicality of lending and the real economy. If foreign-owned bank entrants are less reliant on host-country funding sources and more dependent on foreign sources than their domestically-owned counterparts are, the pro-cyclicality in their supply of loanable funds may be lower.
By now it is well-established that global banks are agents for international shock transmission and generate more integrated international lending activity. Japanese banks transmitted the shocks from Japanese stock price movements that hit their own capital bases into the U.S. real estate market through Japanese bank branches operating in the United States Rosengren 1997, 2000) . inside the EU has been followed by less synchronized, more divergent output fluctuations. Moreover, aggregate credit effects depend on the potential for local borrowers to substitute credit through bond markets and shadow banking (Adrian, Colla, and Shin 2012), which can differ widely across countries.
III.3 Financial Globalization and Crises
Oddly, another reason for enhanced business cycle co-movements across countries could be because banking globalization is associated with a reduced incidence of (idiosyncratic) financial crises in emerging market economies, and thereby with fewer sharp output contractions that accompany such crises (Calvo and Reinhart 2000) . In a wide sample of countries, the share of bank assets held by foreign owners is negatively correlated with the probability of a crisis (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine 2003).
Foreign bank presence was found to have a negative and statistically significant coefficient in crosscountry regressions on crisis probability (Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, and Min 1998). More recent work using data from a sample of 20 developed countries between 1978 and 2009 compared the bilateral linkages and crisis probabilities in periods with and without financial crises (Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Perri 2012). In periods without financial crises, increases in bilateral banking linkages are associated with more divergent output cycles. This relation is significantly weaker and turned positive during financial turmoil periods, suggesting that financial crises induce co-movement among more financially integrated countries and more generally that the type of shock matters for the direction of business cycle co-movement.
IV. Interest rate co-movements and the macroeconomic policy trilemma
The consequences of financial globalization generally, and banking globalization specifically, for the monetary autonomy of countries has been explored in many studies through the lens of interest rate co-movements. 11 Bilateral studies of the economic news effect provide one set of perspectives, though without explicitly considering magnitudes of the financial or banking integration of countries. Consistent with increasing globalization, impacts of U.S. shocks on euro area interest rates have grown larger over time (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2005) , although other studies find more mixed results depending on the particular period studied. 12 These long term structural changes are not the only factors behind changing interest rate co-movements. Similarities in perceived central bank policy reaction functions matter (Goldberg and Klein 2011) . Risk conditions also matter: uncertainty alters the information content of news announcements, the interaction of monetary policy and financial stability objectives of central banks, and the effect of economic news announcements on risk premia (Goldberg and Grisse 2013) .
In a cross-country setting, exchange rate regimes, controls on financial flows, and economic inter-linkages are tied to interest rate co-movements. Countries with de jure or de facto currency pegs with respect to the U.S. dollar have their interest rates and monetary stances move largely in step with U.S. interest rates, tying the broader business cycles more closely together (di Giovanni and Shambaugh 2008, and Frankel, Schmukler and Serven 2004) . Forbes and Chinn (2004) find that the response of bond yields in smaller economies to those of the world's largest economies depends more on trade than financial linkages, whereas Hausman and Wongswan (2011) find both types of linkages are important to the response of bond yields to U.S. monetary shocks.
The macroeconomic policy trilemma facing countries is that only two of the following three options might be achieved: exchange rate fixity, monetary autonomy, and international financial openness. Extensive cross-country and time series tests by Shambaugh (2005, 2010) provide evidence that is broadly supportive of the trilemma, particular with respect to less monetary autonomy observed for countries with fixed exchange rates, and more interest rate independence for countries under flexible exchange rate systems. Klein and Shambaugh (2013) demonstrate that countries with extensive capital controls or floating exchange rates retain more monetary autonomy. However, partial capital controls and limited exchange rate flexibility did not lead countries to have more monetary autonomy than in situations with open capital accounts and fixed exchange rates. The trilemma policy mix of countries also feeds back into their output volatility and inflation performance, as Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2010) document for developing countries.
IV.1 Underpinnings for Global Bank Effects on the Macroeconomic Policy Trilemma
Within this context, why might banking globalization per se matter for monetary autonomy?
Banking globalization, especially through the establishment of branches and affiliates in host countries, can be viewed from the lens of reducing financial frictions in international capital markets. 13 These frictions are largely informational, and can be captured under a broad heading of counterparty risk. The increased global bank entry into many economies is accompanied by an expansion of local lending through these banks. This lending is presumably more information intensive than the previous armslength cross border flows that would have occurred through these same banks. At the same time, there has been an increased use of internal capital markets by these global banks. The presumption here is that the reduced "distance" between the lending source (the global bank) and the client -when this global bank operates through its local branch or subsidiary -increases information intensity. While the costs of moving credit across countries may be reduced when operating within an organization, the information content of the flows associated with lending may be higher, enhancing rather than reducing the stability of loans relative to a cross-border relationship. 14 Indeed, in a systemic crisis or stress situation, such flows may continue to a greater degree than other flows with more counterparty risk. While relevant for the branches and subsidiaries that operate lending operations in countries, information as a stabilizing factor to net lending flows may be less important in economies that some global banks use mainly as locations for raising local funds and offering other portfolio services.
13 For thinking about financial frictions, a broad macroeconomic literature considers a type of financial frictions and effects on lending activity. The early literature takes a closed economy view and models frictions as related to credit constraints related to borrower collateral. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) instead places borrowing constraints on the lender (the bank), still within a closed economy framework. Other frictions arise from access to external finance when liquidity conditions adjust, a phenomenon argued by Kashyap and Stein (2000) Thus, in addition to the looser restrictions on international capital markets access that can enhance the policy trilemma for countries (particularly those without fully flexible exchange rates), I
consider whether the presence of global banks also alters the strength of the trilemma. 15 The empirical exercise below examines whether measures of global bank participation within countries and over time add explanatory power to existing studies of interest rate co-movements across countries and the policy trilemma.
The main empirical specification from Taylor (2005, 2010) is
where changes ∆ at time t in the nominal local interest rate r of country i move in step with changes in the interest rate r of a dominant or base currency b, which is the currency of the nation to which country i has some degree of de facto or de jure exchange rate pegs. Most tests use short-term rates for both country i and the base country. Many variants on this basic test have been derived and tested in prior studies. I follow the trilemma literature, in which tests introduce non-structural functional forms for , capturing the intuition that co-movements of interest rates should be higher for countries with currency peg relationships and with more open capital accounts, captured in variable vector X.
High values of β are interpreted as indicating less monetary autonomy for country i. This interpretation is certainly subject to objections, as tight interest rate co-movements can arise for other reasons, including tight inter-linkages of economies through trade, production integration, or similar industry structures (eg. Stockman and Tesar 1995, and Burstein, Kurz, and Tesar 2008) . Interestingly, specification results of (1) with broader controls introduced for these other country linkages still generate robust conclusions about the roles of exchange rate regimes and capital controls (Shambaugh 2004 17 Klein (2013) also constructs useful measures distinguish between long-standing capital controls that extend over a wide range of assets, described as "walls", and controls that are more narrowly targeted over a limited duration, which he describes as "gates". Klein and Shambaugh (2013) introduce both sets of measures into their benchmark set of tests of the policy trilemma for countries. 18 These high, medium, and low categories follow the idea of Klein and Shambaugh (2013) share is lagged in regression specifications to deal with simultaneity concerns. The global bank presence measures may be positively correlated with financial openness, but these are not identical concepts.
I use the Chinn-Ito measures to describe capital market openness as high, medium, or low, and using the peg, softpeg, and flexible exchange rate regime indicators. The data observations are well distributed over the alternative capital account openness and exchange rate regimes (Table 1) .
Finally, the specifications use times series of nominal short-term interest rates for each country.
The specific short-term interest rates and base countries used for each country at each date, along with all other data sources, are described in the data appendix. I use the KS assignment of base countries for each peg, as presented in Appendix Table A1 . While all of the reported specifications use annual interest rates, I have also run specifications with quarterly interest rates and various lag structures. The qualitative and quantitative results are robust to this frequency choice, but more noise is added to interest rates and regression fits decline. Table 2 reports the results of interest-rate co-movement specifications (1) variables. Table 3 follows a similar format, except that instead of using dummy variables for the capital account openness regime, the continuous Chinn-Ito series is used. Tables 4 and 5 parallel each other, but present separate regression analyses for sample observations divided according to exchange rate regime (peg, soft peg, or float).
IV.3 Results for Global Bank Effects on the Macroeconomic Policy Trilemma
The baseline specifications show that exchange rate regimes are associated with significant differences across countries in interest rate co-movements relative to base country rates (Table 2, specification 1a). The lack of significance on the base rate (non-interacted) shows that on average, pegged exchange rate countries have the tightest co-movement at 0.57, soft peg countries have a weaker co-movement at 0.49, and flexible exchange rate countries do not display statistically significant co-movements . Table 2 , specification 2a demonstrates that those specifications that only distinguish by capital account openness, and not exchange rate regimes, do not measure significant distinctions in interest rate co-movements. When both capital account and exchange rate regimes are simultaneously introduced (Table 2 , specification 3a), the coefficients associated with the exchange rate regimes become more pronounced as the coefficient on pegs rises, and the distinction between low and medium capital accounts openness appears to be more prominent. These results have a lot in common with the central message from prior studies: pegged exchange rate regimes are associated with higher interest rate co-movements. Specifically, while full pegs have the strongest co-movements, with higher point estimates than soft pegs, soft pegs do not seem to provide much added insulation or "monetary policy autonomy", a result that Klein and
Shambaugh confirms in a range of other tests. I find weaker evidence for the role of capital controls in this baseline as compared to prior studies that used earlier sample periods in the empirical analysis.
These earlier periods may have had more extreme capital account restrictions in place than those we associate with our low capital account openness regime. 22 During the period I examine, and for the country sample included, capital controls as captured by the Chinn-Ito measures do not appear to be effective for changing interest rate co-movements.
Results provided in Table 4 baseline specifications correspond to separate specifications for the observations within each exchange rate regime subsample. Only the specification applied to pegged 22 Our "low" openness regime overlaps with the KS "mid-open" categorization.
exchange rate regimes (Table 4 , specification 1) explains much of the interest rate variation with an adjusted 2 of 0.18 and with significant roles for the base country interest rate, regardless of discrete capital account categories. Table 5 finding is that the number of foreign-owned banks relative to the total number of domestic banks is not correlated with patterns interest rate co-movements. However, global bank penetration in credit provision can be significant.
Among pegged exchange rate countries (Tables 4 and 5 , specification c), high foreign bank shares in credit are associated with some increased co-movements of interest rates. This is especially the case for countries already with a high degree of capital account openness. It is interesting that a role for foreign bank penetration in credit provision also is associated with more interest-rate co-movement among floating exchange rate countries. In some specifications, this type of openness strengthens comovement of interest rate, damping the effect of capital account openness per se.
Overall, the regression tables using data from 1995 to 2009 show that the primary distinction across countries in interest rate co-movements arise according to exchange rate regimes, and in particular, if a pegged exchange rate regime is in place. Soft pegs are associated with somewhat lower, but still high and significant interest rate co-movements. Countries that have "fear of floating" (Calvo For pegged and flexible exchange rate countries, interest rate co-movements are greater as foreign bank credit share rise, pointing to a specific channel which may offset some of the direct differences across countries that would come from the capital account openness measures.
Despite this statistical significance, it is important to emphasis the low incremental explanatory power that resulted from the inclusion of the global bank variables. I already have stressed that, ex ante, it might be difficult to have a single generalized effect of global banking on interest rate co-movement or "monetary autonomy" across countries and time. Global banks enter markets for different reasons, and perform very different functions within specific localities. The health of the foreign bank is an important consideration for transmission (Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney 2000) , as is the pattern of foreign bank vulnerabilities (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2011, 2012b) and organizational complexity (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2013a) . For any global bank, the type of shock transmission to any economy should depend on the importance of that economy to the overall business of the parent organization -both as a funding source and an investment location (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2012c) . Additionally, the corresponding aggregate credit effects depend on the potential for local borrowers to substitute credit through bond markets and shadow banking. Other data on measures of financial and foreign exchange market development could be usefully added in future studies.
V. Conclusions
Global banks serve to reduce frictions to international capital flows, especially as they enter local markets through branches and subsidiaries and increase flows with related parties. At the same time, more information intensity of transactions with unrelated parties can support more stable funding, compared with cross-border flows. Such developments are consistent with research on the relative cyclicality of alternative flows and the reduced incidence of crises in host markets.
Does this mean that global banking exacerbates a policy trilemma? In some cases the answer may be yes, but not conclusively so. Global banks follow customers into many markets, and should be correlated with international trade activity, which is not a separate control in the regressions. The dataset used in Klein and Shambaugh (2013) The Claessens -van Horen Bank Ownership Database provides country-year data on the counts of foreign bank (as a share of total banks) and foreign bank assets as a share of total banking assets in each country. These yield the first set of proxies for foreign bank penetration used in the annual and quarterly regression analyses.
IFS Series for quarterly domestic credit (local currencies) are obtained for all countries from 1995-2009 using DLX Haver, and are converted to USD using IFS exchange rates. Country-quarter BIS series on total cross-border, interbank, and local claims from the rest of the world vis-à-vis each country are then merged in order to BIS Claims on Local Residents / IFS Domestic Credit. The asset claims of:
1) All domestic banks in BIS reporting countries 2) All branches and subsidiaries located in BIS reporting countries whose activities are consolidated in a parent bank institution that is located in another BIS reporting country 3) All banking offices located in BIS reporting countries whose controlling parent bank institution resides in a non-BIS reporting country 4) All branches or subsidiaries located in BIS reporting countries whose activities are not consolidated by a controlling parent bank institution in another BIS reporting country (e.g. banking subsidiary with a nonbank controlling parent) Table A1 : Country list Presents base country pairings, interest rate types used, and period coverage for the country sample (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) 
